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The Hawthorne studies became famous because of the discovery of the “Hawthorne effect”: “a marked increase
in production related only to special social position and social treatment”. They mark the beginning of the
Human Relations School. This article demonstrates that the Hawthorne research does not pass a methodological
quality test. Even if  methodological shortcomings were waived, there is no proof of a Hawthorne effect in the
original data. The following five myths are debunked: (i) scientific worth, (ii) continuous improvement, (iii)
social factors prevailing over physical factors and pay, (iv) wholehearted cooperation, and (v) the neurotic
worker. The following five factors are held responsible for the creation and survival of the Hawthorne myth: (i)
a story too good to be untrue, (ii) bias and selective accounts by original researchers and “laziness” among later
scientists, (iii) social factors do matter, and (iv) a story that fits the cognitive world and interests of psycholo-
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The Hawthorne studies, conducted from 1924 to 1933
at the Western Electric Company’s Hawthorne plant,
represent a major historical event in the development
of social sciences. In industrial sociology or psycholo-
gy, no other theory or set of experiments has stimulated
more research and controversy nor contributed more to
a change in management thinking than the Hawthorne
studies and the human relations movement they spawned
(1).
The research consisted of a series of experiments in
order to study the effects of illumination, rest breaks,
length of workday and workweek, wages, food, humid-
ity, and temperature on worker performance. Moreover,
more than 20 000 interviews with Hawthorne employ-
ees were conducted. These studies have become famous,
not because of the light they shed on the nature of the
aforementioned relations, but because of the “discov-
ery” of a special effect, the “Hawthorne effect”. Text-
books characterize this effect more or less as follows:
“No matter what the researchers did, productivity went
up. Even when work conditions were made worse than
they were originally, the women worked harder and
more efficiently. The secret ingredient? The attention
shown to them by all those concerned with the study
was the variable which influenced their behaviour” (2,
p.372).
This conclusion has become part of the accepted
wisdom among social scientists and intervention re-
searchers. With time, it has become increasingly com-
mon to attribute any unexpected result occurring in an
experiment with human participants to the Hawthorne
effect (3). Accordingly, for generation after generation,
millions of students have been raised with the story that
people who are singled out for a study of any kind im-
prove their performance or behavior not because of any
specific condition being tested, but simply because of
all of the attention they receive.
Historically, this conclusion marks the beginning of
a new era in industrial psychology: the Human Relations
School. This influential movement promotes worker-
management harmony, while emphasizing the role of
social factors, group processes, social skills, leadership,
and “worker morale” in influencing work productivity.
The aim of this contribution is to (i) demonstrate that
the Hawthorne effect is a persistent story; (ii) to ana-
lyze what actually happened in the Hawthorne research;
(iii) to debunk five Hawthorne myths; and (iv) to ana-
lyze how this story could emerge and survive.
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Hawthorne effect: a persistent story
Primary sources (4–8) do not mention the term Haw-
thorne effect. The term was probably introduced by
French (9), who described it as “a marked increase in
production related only to special social position and
social treatment [p 101]”. The appendix, which covers
a 50-year time span, provides eight examples of defini-
tions of the Hawthorne effect. It could easily be expand-
ed with similar examples (10, 11).
What actually happened in the Hawthorne research?
The Western Electric Factory was the supplier of tele-
phone equipment to the last American Bell System. The
Hawthorne plant was its main factory. At the start of
the studies, it offered employment to some 29 000 men
and women, many of them immigrants. The Hawthorne
research consisted of the following six, partly overlap-
ping, studies: (i) three illumination experiments (No-
vember 1924–April 1927), (ii) the first relay assembly
test room (April 1927–February 1933), (iii) the second
relay assembly group (August 1928–March 1929), (iv)
the mica splitting test room (October 1928–September
1930), (v) the interview program (September 1928–early
1931), and (vi) the bank wiring observation room study
(November 1931-May 1932).
The researchers published their studies in five re-
ports (4–8). The most thorough was that of Roethlis-
berger & Dickson (6), who presented data on all six
studies. The Whitehead book (5) covers only, though in
great detail, the first relay experiment in the assembly
test room. Although Mayo, a Harvard business profes-
sor, was not the director of the studies [he first visited
the factory in 1928 in the middle of the first relay ex-
periment], he became the main interpreter and prophet
of the Hawthorne studies. He wrote forewords for the
reports of Whitehead (5) and Roethlisberger (7), and a
preface for the publication by Roethlisberger & Dick-
son (6). Roethlisberger and Whitehead worked at Har-
vard, and Dickson was an officer of the Western Elec-
tric Company. By November 1932, the economic reces-
sion caused the suspension of the studies. Operators of
the famous first relay assembly test room had all been
laid off by then.
Illumination experiments, 1924–1927. The illumination
studies are not always formally considered to be part of
the Hawthorne studies. When, in the early 1920s, the
electrical suppliers of Western Electric claimed that bet-
ter lighting would improve productivity (12), the com-
pany started three illumination experiments. The Nation-
al Research Council (NRC) sponsored the research. The
data were never formally reported, and it is unknown
how many employees were studied. The best available
“official” description is a 4-page summary (out of 604
pages) in the book by Roethlisberger & Dickson (6, p
14–18). These authors repeatedly refer to a short tenta-
tive report by Snow (13), the NRC’s representative. The
final report of this project was never delivered to the
NRC (14, p 183). Snow concluded (experiment 1) that
“The corresponding production efficiencies by no means
followed the magnitude or trend of the lighting intensi-
ties. The output bobbed up and down without direct re-
lation to the amount of illumination” (6, p 15). The re-
searchers learned from these studies that light was not
the only factor that influenced employee output and that
the results could have been influenced by any one of
several variables. They also decided that further stud-
ies should not be conducted in regular shop departments
or on fairly large groups.
First relay assembly test room, April 1927–February
1933. The most famous experiment was the first study
that took place in the relay assembly test room. Stimu-
lated by the illumination studies, the researchers “de-
cided to isolate a small group of workers in a separate
room, somewhat removed from the regular workforce,
where their behaviour could be studied carefully and
systematically” (6, p 19). The experimental group con-
sisted of five young women. A sixth “lay out operator”
distributed the materials among these five operators (4,
p 58) (figure 1). She sat next to operator 5, and her in-
come was based on the output of the five operators.
According to Whitehead (5, p 14) “The actual method
of selection was quite informal and somewhat obscure”.
The operators were selected because they were “thor-
oughly experienced” and “willing and cooperative”, and
not to be married soon. After the first two operators were
identified, these two invited the three other girls. The
operators’ task was to assemble relays (electromagnet-
ic switches) for telephones. A relay consisted of between
26 and 52 parts. The operators assembled over 150 dif-
ferent types between 1927 and 1932. Typical cycle times
Figure 1. The first relay assembly test group. [Source: Roethlisberger
& Dickson (6), figure 3, p 24]
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were within 1 minute, and an operator assembled ap-
proximately 500 relays each day.
In a very complicated order, depending on decisions
of the experimenters and influenced by economic cir-
cumstances, two independent variables were manipulat-
ed, rest pauses and duration of work, in 24 experimen-
tal periods (and not 13 as often reported). In addition,
in period 3 a piecework system was introduced. It was
based on the average output of the experimental group
and not, as before, on the output of the entire depart-
ment. Changes were introduced cumulatively, and no
control group was established. In the various periods
(combinations of) rest pauses and work duration were
introduced. For example, breaks were introduced in pe-
riod 4, removed in period 12, and then re-installed. The
number of workhours was decreased in periods 8 and 9
and restored in period 10 to the normal baseline level,
and so forth.
In short, the researchers concluded that productivi-
ty increased clearly over time primarily because of the
changed supervision of the workers. Rest pauses, short-
ening of the workweek, and the individualized reward
system were considered less important. [See, for exam-
ple, the reports of Mayo 4, p 65; 8, p 63–64, p 72). In-
spection of the original data reveals that there was no
steady increase in output. For example, in period 12—
no lunch and no rest pauses at all—hourly output rates
clearly decreased for four of the five operators (6, fig-
ure 6, p 76; 5, p 88; and 5, figures B-4, volume 2). Op-
erator 3 even said (6, p 72): “Give me back the rests
and see how my output goes up”.
The internal validity of this experiment is further
invalidated by selective attrition. At the beginning of
period 8 (January 1928) operators 1a and 2a were re-
moved from the experimental group because they were
too busy “talking and fooling”. Note that the five oper-
ators were allowed to talk during work, whereas, in the
regular department, the operators were expected to work
in silence (5, p 111). Although they had been warned
repeatedly and threatened with disciplinary action, they
“did not display that wholehearted cooperation desired
by the investigators” (6, p 53). “Their controlled exper-
iment was being jeopardized, and something had to be
done” (6, p 54). They were dismissed “for the best in-
terest of the test” (p 55) because of gross insubordina-
tion and declining or static output. Whitehead speaks of
the rejection of the obstructive minority (5, p 119), but
Mayo tells the story differently, writing that operators
1a and 2a “dropped out” (4, p 58) and were “permitted
to withdraw” (4, p 114–115). However, in a 1929 letter
written to the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial,
Mayo wrote of operator 2a: “One girl, formerly in the
test group, was reported to have ‘gone Bolshevik’ and
had been dropped” (cited in 15, p 54; and 10, p 871).
There is some evidence of this type of worker resistance
on the part of these two operators in Whitehead’s re-
port: “their attitude that we [the researchers] only want-
ed to make them establish a record and then forever af-
ter equal it” (5, p 118). Roethlisberger (7, p 13) denies
these replacements: “During the first year and a half of
the experiment, everybody was happy, both the investi-
gators and the operators”.
It is probable that new operator 2 had also taken part
in the illumination studies (16). Whitehead (5, p 15) also
reports that operator 5 resigned from the firm for fami-
ly reasons in the middle of 1929 and rather unexpect-
edly returned 10 months later. In the meantime, a new
substitute had been appointed, number 5a. The return
of operator 5 caused trouble in the group because that
would imply that 5a had to return to the regular shop
where she would earn less (5, p 143). Most interesting-
ly, new operators 1 and 2 (friends in the main shop)
immediately proved to be high performers (6, figures
6, p 76). An analysis of the output of the five operators
reveals that operator 2 “jumped immediately into the
lead and maintained it throughout the experiment” (6, p
161–162). She also “held all records in speed tests and
in hourly, daily, weekly and period output, and she re-
ceived the highest scores in the various dexterity and
intelligence tests” (6, p 167). The other new operator,
operator 1, soon took second place. In the last two peri-
ods before her dismissal, operator 1a had ranked fifth.
New operator 2 became the informal leader of the group.
She pressed her colleagues to increase their output (5,
p 123; 6, p 167).
Second relay assembly group, August 1928–March 1929.
The investigators wanted to single out the effect of the
change in the method of payment on output and there-
fore started the next two studies. In the second relay
study, five experienced relay assemblers (women) were
selected by the foreman of the regular department and
formed into a special group. They assembled relays un-
der normal work conditions (eg, supervision) in a regu-
lar department, where they worked in adjacent positions
at the same bench. Unlike their colleagues in the first
experiment, they were not segregated into a separate
room and remained in the regular department. Howev-
er, whereas the normal workers’ salary was based on
the output of the entire department (approximately 100
employees), the experimental group received the same
type of remuneration as the operators in the first relay
assembly group: their salary was based on the average
output of just the five women.
After a 5-week “base period”, the experimental pe-
riod followed. According to Roethlisberger & Dickson,
average hourly output increased by 12.6% (6, table 12,
p 132). Contrary to planning, the experimental period
continued for only 9 weeks. After a few weeks, “the
foreman began to report to the investigators that the
kompier.pmd 23.10.2006, 15:36404
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presence of a special group in his department was caus-
ing considerable friction among the other employees, as
they too wanted similar consideration” (6, p 133). The
problems quickly increased and “it became necessary,
in order to preserve the department’s morale, to return
the operators to the regular method of payment” (6, p
133). The output of the five promptly dropped by 16%
(third period: 7 weeks).
Many researchers would consider these rises and
falls in outcomes as supporting evidence for the impor-
tance of financial incentives. Not Roethlisberger &
Dickson, who repeatedly (6, p 158, p 577) and without
proof suggested that the second group performed well
because they wanted to equal the record of the first re-
lay test group.
Mica splitting test room, October 1928–September 1930.
The objective of the study in the mica splitting test room
was to investigate the effects of individual piecework
(throughout the whole experiment) and overtime. Over-
time implied a workweek of 55.5 hours. Occasionally
the girls also worked on Sunday (and were then paid
100% extra). Furthermore, longer experimental periods
were chosen. Apart from these experimental factors, the
design of the mica experiment was as similar as possi-
ble to the first relay assembly test. Of the five women
originally selected for this experiment, only two were
willing to participate. They selected three other girls and
formed a test group of five. Mica splitting was consid-
ered one of the most desirable Hawthorne-shop jobs for
women. The work was highly repetitive, but required
considerable skill (it took 2 to 3 years to really master
it) and consequently was well paid.
Table 1 provides an overview of the five test peri-
ods. It shows that another experimental factor was ma-
nipulated, rests (two 10 minute-periods, at 0900 and at
1430) versus no rests. The last manipulation (period 5,
a 40-hour workweek) was not deliberately chosen by the
experimenters but the result of the recession.
During each of the five periods individual output was
counted, and observers observed the operators and re-
ported their opinions. A strong dislike for working on
Sundays appeared. Operator M4 (1 March 1929): “I sup-
pose we’ll be working on Palm Sunday and Easter Sun-
day. We won’t call it Sunday anymore, we’ll call it
Slave Day” (6, p 141). During the experiment the posi-
tion of the mica girls in the regular department was se-
verely threatened. Much of the work was transferred to
the Kearny plant in New Jersey. Job insecurity affected
the five operators (6, p 143). Operator M4: “Now that
the work is dropping off, every time the other girls [from
the regular department] meet us, they ask, ‘Are you still
on mica?’ When we tell them we are, I can see they are
sorry although they don’t say it”. An overview of the
average hourly output by week of the five operators is
presented by Roethlisberger & Dickson 6 (p 147). On
the basis of these data, the researchers concluded that
output “tended to increase during the first year” (6, p
149). An inspection of the original data (6, p 147) indi-
cates that this seems imprecise. First, when compared
with the baseline period (period 1), there seems to have
been a slight decline in average output when the girls
were moved into the test room (period 2). Next, it ap-
pears that, when rest pauses were introduced in period
3, “a moderate but steady rise in rate of output” took
place (6, p 146). The authors also pointed to a decline
in output during the second year and attributed it to the
considerable tension among the five, because they were
afraid of losing their jobs (6, p 153).
Interview program, September 1928–early 1931. “As the
test room studies had clearly indicated that there was a
close relation between employee morale and supervi-
sion”, the interview program started as a plan for im-
proving supervision (6, p 189). The company wanted to
determine what constituted “an effective working to-
gether of supervisors and employees” and decided to ask
the employees themselves to express frankly their
(dis)likes about their work environment. The first round
of interviews took place in the Inspection Branch (ap-
proximately 1600 employees). Anonymity was guaran-
teed. The program was extended, first (in 1929) to the
Operating Branch and eventually to all eight branches
in the Hawthorne plant (1930). In these new rounds, the
interview method was changed from a direct (resem-
bling a questionnaire method) to an indirect approach
(6, p 203; 7, p 20), because the researchers felt that they
might miss what was really important to the employees
if they themselves directed the interview. In the indi-
rect approach that concentrated on the concept of
“meaning”, the employee was allowed “to choose his
own topic”. The average time for a single interview ac-
Table 1. Mica splitting test room—schedule of test periods. (Source: Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939 (6), table XIV, p 138)
Period Special feature Dates included Duration in weeks
I In regular department; overtime, no rests 27 August 1928 to 20 October 1928 8
II Moved to test room; overtime, no rests 22 October 1928 to 24 November 1928 5
III Overtime with two 10-minute rests 26 November 1928 to 15 June 1929 29
IV No overtime, two 10 minute rests 17 June 1929 to 17 May 1930 48
V 8-hour day, 5-day week, two 10-minute rests 19 May 1930 to 13 September 1930 17
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cordingly increased from 30 to 90 minutes. All of the
interviews were written down as near to verbatim pos-
sible, and an analyzing department, part of Hawthorne’s
special Industrial Research Division, analyzed the in-
terviews. By 1930, a total of 21 126 employees had been
interviewed. The interviews served as an input for su-
pervisory training, for the improvement of unfavorable
work conditions, and as research material. Table 2 pre-
sents the outcomes of the re-calculation of the original
data (an overview of the 15 issues that received the most
unfavorable comments in the 1929 study among 10 300
employees from the Operating Branch).
By far the highest number of negative comments
concerned “payment” (rate revision: 1541, piecework
rate: 1510, wages: 1284, piecework in general: 1123),
followed by “lockers” and “safety and health”. “Super-
vision” came fourth, followed by a long list of material
work conditions. Roethlisberger & Dickson did not con-
clude that especially conditions of pay were considered
important by the Hawthorne employees (6, p 240). From
the interview program the researchers concluded that,
apart from the formal Hawthorne organization, also sev-
eral types of informal organization existed and that work
groups controlled their output through social norms and
corrective actions.
Bank wiring observation room study, November 1931–
May 1932. In order to supplement the large interview
program, an observational study was conducted to fur-
ther study how work groups controlled their output
through social norms and behavior. There were no ex-
perimental manipulations. Fourteen male operators were
observed. Three solder men, two inspectors, and nine
wiremen worked in a special room, on terminal banks
for telephone exchanges. It was an already existing
group that performed their regular duties and reported
to their regular supervisors. As before, they were paid
by department-wide piecework; thus their income was
related to the output of approximately 100 workers. The
men were observed by an observer, in “the role of an
disinterested spectator” (6, p 388) and much like “an
anthropological field worker” (6, p 389), and repeated-
ly interviewed.
The output of the group remained practically un-
changed (6, p 424). The men practiced the concept of a
“fair days’ work”: “the working group as a whole actu-
ally determined the output of individual workers by ref-
erence to a standard, pre-determined but never clearly
stated, that represented the group conception of a fair
day’s work. This standard was rarely, if ever, in accord
with the standards of the efficiency engineers” (8, p 70).
If one operator worked faster, he was corrected by his
co-workers who called him “slave”, “rate buster”, or
“speed king”. Another corrective practice was “bing-
ing”, hitting him sharply on the upper arm. Operators
that were too slow, “chiselers”, also met with group dis-
approval. Group pressure for controlled output was typ-
ically explained by the men as follows (6, p 417): “If
we exceed our day’s work by any appreciable amount,
something will happen. The ‘rate’ might be cut, the
‘rate’ might be raised, the ‘bogey’ [an output standard]
might be raised, someone might be laid off, or the su-
pervisor might ‘bawl out’ the slower men” (7, p 22).
Debunking five Hawthorne myths
Over time, these studies have been interpreted, reinter-
preted, and often misinterpreted. Close examination of
the original data as reported in the quoted primary sourc-
es leads to the conclusion that there are, in fact, the fol-
lowing five interrelated Hawthorne myths: (i) the myth
of scientific worth, (ii) the myth of continuous improve-
ment, (iii) the myth of social factors being more impor-
tant than physical factors and pay, (iv) the myth of
wholehearted cooperation, and (v) the myth of the neu-
rotic worker.
The myth of scientific worth. An assessment of the meth-
odological quality of these case studies (17) would re-
sult in the lowest qualification (ie, evidence that is de-
scriptive, anecdotal or authoritative). These studies do
not pass an elementary methodological quality test.
There was a lack of scientific rigor, confounding of ex-
perimental factors, and so many uncontrolled variables
that it became virtually impossible to identify any causal
relationship (3, p 364). There was no control group (all
studies). Utilizing a control group would have made it
possible to compare the “experimental group outcomes”
with the “natural flow of events”. For example, in the
mica splitting test room, it would have made sense to
Table 2. Fifteen issues that received the highest numbers of
unfavorable comments in interviews in the operating branch
(10 300 persons: 6800 men, 3500 women) in 1929. (Recalcu-
lated from Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939 (6, p 232–5).
Issue Number of unfavorable comments
 1. Payment (eg, rate revision, piecework rate) 6816
 2. Lockers 3540
 3. Safety and health 3208
 4. Supervision 2737
 5. Workhours (eg, overtime) 2273
 6. Washrooms 2044
 7. Light 1689
 8. Ventilation 1524
 9. “Bogey” (a performance standard) 1384
10. Job placement 1318
11. Fatigue 1311
12. Dirt 1297
13. Tools and machines 1281
14. Material 1241
15. Temperature 1120
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compare the decline in output during the second year
with the performance in a control or reference group.
And a control group(s) design in the first study on the
relay assembly test room could have made it less diffi-
cult to disentangle potential influences of ergonomic and
social factors. Furthermore, there was a very small num-
ber of participants (all studies, except the interview pro-
gram), and there was selection bias (motivated volun-
teers) and attrition that evidently had an impact on the
outcomes (first relay assembly test). As to the illumina-
tion experiments, there are no data, and there is no offi-
cial report.
The myth of continuous improvement. A main conclu-
sion of the researchers was that “In the course of the
test room experiment, the one outstanding factor which
challenged interpretations was the general improvement
in the output of the operators, which rose independent-
ly of the specific changes in conditions of work made
during the study” (6, p 189). This conclusion was not
justified in the first relay study (5, p 88), nor was it jus-
tified for the other experiments. In the first relay study
hourly output rates clearly decreased for four of five
operators after, in period 12, time for lunch and rest
pauses were taken away. By complicated mixtures of
the two measures “average hourly output” and “total
weekly output”, this issue was obscured by the research-
ers. For example, Mayo’s discussion of period 12 of the
relay assembly test room emphasized the increase in to-
tal output but initially ignored (4), and later significant-
ly downplayed (8), the declining hourly output rate (see
also 18, p 26). The account of Roethlisberger (7, p 13)
is also not correct. He wrote that, in period 12, output
“maintained its high level”. Moreover, Jones (19) uti-
lized multivariate regression techniques to re-analyze
the original data of the first relay study and “found es-
sentially no evidence of Hawthorne effects” (“a com-
mon effect that could be regarded as a pure result of
the experimentation”, p 467). In the bank wiring study
the output of the group under study did not improve but
remained at the same level. Clearly, in this case, being
part of an experiment did not have an impact on the
worker’s performance. There was also no steady in-
crease in the mica test.
The myth of social factors being more important than
physical factors and pay. Central in the work of Mayo
is the thesis that social factors are more important than
physical factors and pay. Accordingly, Roethlisberger
& Dickson (6, p 575–6) concluded that “none of the re-
sults [in both relay studies and the mica test] gave the
slightest substantiation to the theory that the worker is
primarily motivated by economic interest”. The real rea-
son behind the “general improvement” was a change in
attitude and morale due to changed supervision (p 190).
Whitehead (5, p 128) also concluded that supervision
was this general factor.
This conclusion is in contrast to the data from these
studies. After a preferred wage incentive system was in-
troduced, worker output rose (second relay study). Af-
ter the preferred incentive system was taken away, out-
put promptly dropped (second relay study). When ex-
perimental changes were introduced without a change
in the regular incentive system, no clear development
in weekly output per worker resulted (mica test). When
the pay system remained unchanged, performance re-
mained unchanged (bank wiring study). In addition, the
interview program underlines the importance of pay fac-
tors. In a list of the 15 most prominent company issues
“payment” ranked first, whereas “supervision” ranked
fourth (table 2).
The “social factors prevail” conclusion has been crit-
icized earlier. Parsons (14, 20) argued that the workers
in the first test room experiment were motivated because
they systematically received information feedback (ie,
knowledge of results about their output rates) and the
more individualized piecework pay system. Other schol-
ars performed secondary analyses of the same study’s
original data. Franke & Kaul (21) and Franke (22) con-
ducted extensive statistical tests, such as time-series
multiple regression analyses. They concluded that, both
for the group and for individual workers, the traditional
factors “imposition of managerial discipline”, “econom-
ic adversity”, and “rest pauses” were responsible for
most of the variance in the output scores (21, p 636).
No matter how justified these authors’ appeal for
thorough statistical analyses may be, even sophisticat-
ed analyses cannot rescue a poor study design. The point
is that, even if the methodological shortcomings in the
Hawthorne research were waived, neither the original
data nor later re-analyses permit the conclusion that so-
cial factors are more important than physical factors and
pay. On the contrary, especially pay appears to be a key
factor in these studies.
The myth of wholehearted cooperation. According to
Mayo (8, p 64) the first relay assembly test group “gave
itself whole-heartedly and spontaneously to cooperation
in the experiment”. As Roethlisberger & Dickson for-
mulated it: “A new supervisor-employee relationship
had developed in which there existed a spirit of cooper-
ation with the experimenters and management” (6, p
154). Potential antagonism between management and
the Hawthorne employees was denied by Roethlisberg-
er & Dickson: “In the interviews of 1929, where over
40 000 complaints were voiced, there was no single un-
favorable comment expressed about the company in
general” (6, p 536). The image was created of one hap-
py organizational family and, in the first relay test room,
of a committed team that was willing to work ever
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harder, irrespective of the physical work conditions and
conditions of payment. Nevertheless, clear illustrations
of worker resistance and apprehension regarding the ex-
periments were documented by Whitehead (5) and Ro-
ethlisberger & Dickson (6). For example, consider the
mica test. Only two of the five originally selected oper-
ators wanted to join this test group, and operator M1
stated: “The girls all tried to say they were just going to
get us in there and time us and then cut the rates, but I
thought the other girls who were going were all nice and
then, too, it would be quiet in there” (6, p 143–4). Also
in the bank wiring study, the men did not trust the in-
vestigators. W1 explained: “You know I had the idea
that what you people were trying to do was to see if you
could get us to do just as much work in six hours as we
are doing now”. “About everybody down there who has
talked about it has the same idea” (6, p 401). These were
early reactions, but, also in the course of the first relay
test, many indications of antagonism between the oper-
ators and management have been documented. Opera-
tors 1a and 2a faced disciplinary action (5, p 111–9) and
were eventually dismissed from the test group (25 Jan-
uary 1928). From Whitehead (5, p 118), we learn that
not only their relation with supervisors was bad, but also
their relations within the group. On January 23rd, oper-
ator 4 and the lay-out operator requested that either they
or operator 2a be removed from the test room. In addi-
tion, the supervisors did not always live in harmony.
Whitehead (5, p 111–2) reported a struggle between the
supervisor of the first test room and his superior about
the acceptability of the usual talking of the five opera-
tors. A final example: the second relay test ended be-
cause the women in the regular department demanded
the same rewards as the experimental group. Bramel &
Friend (10, 23) have also pointed to the fact “that abun-
dant evidence of worker resistance at Hawthorne was
suppressed in influential accounts of the research” (23,
p 860). Unfortunately, over time, this observation—that
in itself is correct—has been overshadowed by strong
criticisms of the presumed ideological nature of their
arguments [eg, “Marxist propaganda” (24–27)].
The myth of the neurotic worker. It is interesting to note
that, whenever the investigators refered to “worker ap-
prehension”, worker resistance or conflicts between
workers and management, such phenomena were ex-
plained in terms of the mental health status of the
employee(s) or by personal circumstances outside the
factory (such as family conditions). Worker resistance
was thus transformed into an individual, irrational psy-
chological phenomenon, an indicator of poor individu-
al adaptation, without any clear relation to the direct
work environment (7, 28).
Referring to the interview program, Roethlisberger
& Dickson concluded that “unbalance in the worker”
was expressed as complaints and grievances (6, p 575).
Negative attitudes regarding work conditions and style
of management were thus explained away by using
terms borrowed from psychopathology, such as “obses-
sive thinking” (6, p 310, p 575), “personal disequilibri-
um” (4, p 172), “obsessive response” (8, p 66), “emo-
tional blockage” (8, p 72) and “preoccupations” (6, p
184, 292, 311). However, it does not seem improbable
that many of the employees’ complaints and grievances
were influenced by their previous experiences with time
and motions studies, with bosses, engineers, and rate-
setters (29). In addition, the “Bolshevik” behavior of
operator 2a was explained by her change in mental atti-
tude due to a case of anemia (6, p 170), demonstrating
“how an organic unbalance could find expression in crit-
icism of company policy” (6, p 325). In the case of op-
erator 1a, the other dismissed girl, a nonwork explana-
tion is offered: She “had been married; it might be ex-
pected that after this event her work had no longer its
previous significance, and, being easily influenced, she
followed the lead of her friend” (6, p 170). Whitehead
admits that this interpretation “overlooks the fact that
for some months operator 1a had been the leader in this
revolt” (5, p 118).
How could this story emerge and survive?
This paper provides evidence that debunks the Haw-
thorne studies and the Hawthorne effect. It was shown
that the experiments do not meet basic methodological
criteria, and I critically assessed five Hawthorne myths.
Although this is the first article that unfolds the Haw-
thorne story as five connected Hawthorne myths and
that debunks each of them, this is not the first article
that has critically addressed the Hawthorne research. Al-
ready in 1953, Argyle (30) concluded that the Haw-
thorne researchers provided “no quantitative evidence
for the conclusion for which this experiment is famous,
that the increase of output was due to a changed rela-
tionship with supervision” (p 100). Other critical ac-
counts of the Hawthorne research have followed (1, 3,
10, 12, 14, 16, 19–21, 31–33). Some of the critical au-
thors performed secondary analyses on the original data;
others interviewed original operators or supervisors. But
what most of these contributions have in common is
their criticism of the common interpretation of the data
in terms of a Hawthorne effect. Notwithstanding these
publications, the appendix demonstrates that the story
of the Hawthorne effect is still much alive. [See also
the report of Olsen (11).] Obviously, previous studies
were not successful in putting an end to biased accounts
and interpretations. The question thus becomes how this
story could emerge, and how it could survive. This is-
sue has been touched upon by some authors (19, 31, 34),
but a satisfactory answer has not yet been given.
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Therefore, necessarily not without speculation, I address
this question in more detail now. I postulate that the fol-
lowing five interrelated factors contribute(d) to the birth
and survival of the Hawthorne myths.
1. The story is too good to be untrue: The story told—
employees improving their output irrespective of the
physical work conditions and pay—is too good to be
untrue. Over time, the Hawthorne effect has become an
urban legend. It could be argued that once you have got
the story, you do not need the data to prove it. Even so,
once you have heard the story, you will never forget it,
especially since this message is echoed by authoritative
authors of scientific handbooks, and since it is deliv-
ered to students in the beginnings of their studies (“pri-
macy effect”).
2. The original researchers have been biased and selec-
tive in their reports; later generations have been “lazy”.
The Hawthorne researchers were not always successful
in distinguishing facts from fiction. Mayo [in the fore-
word to Whitehead’s report (5, p viii)] states that “The
presentation of facts invariably implies something of
selection”. His accounts were indeed selective in terms
of the information reported. The original authors omit-
ted, downplayed, and de-emphasized certain features of
their cases. Especially Mayo (4, 8), in his role of scien-
tific popularizer (35), has been important in this respect
(18, p 27). He polished the story to its too-good-to-be-
untrue status. As Gillespie (34, p 178) has argued:
“Mayo was a social scientist trying to use the factory
research as the empirical basis of his social theories”.
His writings show a “strong need to present as convinc-
ing a case as possible, without confusing the issue with
qualifications” (18, p 27). The more popularized text of
Roethlisberger (7) expresses the same tendency. Even
so, researchers from later generations often did not both-
er to check the original data. When asked why psychol-
ogists have been much too uncritical in accepting the
accounts of the original researchers and scientific pop-
ularizers, Parsons, quoted by Rice (33), pointed to a cer-
tain indolence. He replied “because they are lazy”.
3. Social factors do matter. Social factors (eg, style of
leadership, social processes within and between groups,
social facilitation, and inhibition) are definitely impor-
tant in understanding employee well-being and perfor-
mance. In an earlier report (36), I compared seven the-
ories on the psychosocial work environment and con-
cluded that four of these identify social relations at work
as one of the key job features. Partly, the popularity of
the Hawthorne story reflects the empirical fact that so-
cial factors are important in explaining differences in
performance and well-being. The point is that it is not
only social factors that matter.
The Hawthorne-based scientific recognition of so-
cial factors deserves two further comments. First, it il-
lustrates the, at that time, tremendous gap between so-
cial scientists and the shop floor. [See also the report of
Zickar (37).] It is cynical that the fact that workers too
do have attitudes, feelings, and sentiments is presented
as a scientific breakthrough. Second, the ground-break-
ing conclusion that workers’ behavior is influenced by
more factors than just pay and physical work conditions
was not new at all. More than 20 years before, Freder-
ick Taylor (38, p 6) described the “soldiering” or un-
derworking phenomenon: “deliberately working slow-
ly, so as to avoid doing a full day’s work”. Taylor ex-
plained that one of the reasons for soldiering was the
belief among workers that, if they would work harder,
higher performance standards and the loss of jobs would
follow. He recognized systematic soldiering as a social
phenomenon, stemming from “reasoning caused by their
relations with other men” (38, p 10).
4. The story is in accordance with the cognitive world
and interests of psychologists. We believe that, due to
their training, many psychologists, have a tendency to
view societal phenomena through the micro-level glass-
es of psychology. They seek the explanation for behav-
ior in “subjective” factors, such as individual features
of the person (eg, within-person processes such as per-
ception). Or they seek explanations in between-person
processes (eg, group processes). Such psychological
explanations are preferred over explanations in terms of
more contextual “objective” characteristics of the envi-
ronment. The Hawthorne explanation (attention, social
influences) fits well in this cognitive scheme. In a simi-
lar vein, the practical implications of the Human Rela-
tions School (ie, that supervisors should learn social
skills, and learn to interview and counsel their employ-
ees) suited psychologists well, as it was well in line with
their psychological expertise. Obviously, psychologists
were important and needed because they had the tools
to deal with these problems.
5. The story is in accordance with the cognitive world
and interests of management. Basically management’s
task was twofold, to ensure worker productivity and to
control the social process in the factories. In the soci-
etal context of the first decades of the 20th century—
the United States was a capitalist society characterized
by major labor unrest and disputes—the accomplish-
ment of both tasks was not easy. And here was this man-
agement philosophy, with a scientific foundation, that
claimed that management could reach these two goals.
[See also the report of Gillespie (34, p 210 and p 238).]
Paying attention to their “unbalanced” workers would
bring both goals near, a harmonious and productive
factory. The message of Mayo (social factors prevail,
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social influences are of utmost significance) even meant
that there was no need to redesign work conditions; what
really mattered were the social (nonmaterial) concerns!
If causes were socially rooted, there was no need to im-
prove work conditions or pay.
Historical studies must be understood in their “at that
time” scientific and societal context. [See also the re-
port of Gillespie (34).] Therefore, it would neither be
fair nor correct to judge the Hawthorne studies by the
scientific and methodological standards of today. Much
of today’s standard expertise (experimental and quasi-
experimental designs, multivariate analyses, theories on
work motivation, and group performance) was not avail-
able to these pioneers.
Accordingly, it is not the aim to simply criticize the
Hawthorne researchers. In fact, in retrospect, one should
acknowledge the considerable scope and pioneering na-
ture of the Hawthorne research. It is unique that a fac-
tory, in collaboration with universities, built up a strong
research infrastructure and maintained it over a long
period of time. Especially the interview program con-
stituted an impressive study. Unfortunately, only parts
of it have been reported. Moreover, the Hawthorne re-
search program deserves to be commended for its “mod-
ern” interdisciplinary approach and combination of
study designs: quasi-experimental longitudinal study
designs in a natural setting, observational studies, and
interview studies. Several potential strong points of the
experimental studies deserve to be recognized as well.
The following multiple sources of quantitative and qual-
itative data collection were utilized: performance data,
observations, interviews, physiological data (eg, blood
pressure, heart rate), and medical examinations. In this
sense, the Hawthorne research does indeed constitute a
hallmark in the history of social sciences.
Nevertheless, the importance of these studies is se-
riously overstated in the literature. We have shown that
the Hawthorne effect is a myth. One might argue that,
although there is no proof of a Hawthorne effect in the
original studies, it does not mean that there is no such
thing as a Hawthorne effect. However, few people will
disagree with the fact that human beings, both in every-
day life and when part of a scientific investigation, “re-
flect upon their situation and react to it when they con-
sider this appropriate”. Consequently, there is no need
to call this a special effect (3, p 366).
Will there be a future for the Hawthorne effect? I
am afraid that there is. Earlier criticism has not been
sufficient to put an end to this most persistent myth.
Nevertheless, through a thorough account of what real-
ly happened in the Hawthorne research, through the for-
mulation and debunking of five Hawthorne myths, and
through the postulation of five constituting factors, I
hope to have contributed to the unraveling and “unmask-
ing” of the Hawthorne research. At the least, in the fu-
ture, in the teaching of new students, we need to differ-
entiate between fact and fiction.
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Appendix
Examples of definitions of the Hawthorne effect (1955–2006)
General psychology and research methodology textbooks
“The most famous example of a laboratory effect is the Hawthorne study, in which selected factory workers were so
pleased at the experimental attentions of the management that they produced steadily more with each new change,
regardless of whether it was an improvement. The highest productivity came with the final change, which took
away all breaks, hot lunches, and incentive payment.” (1, p 340)
“These influences—receiving special attention and acting within changed social relations- produced effects that far
outweighed the effects of the experimental treatments the experimenters had planned to study. The effects on actors
of being singled out to receive the special attention of being treated as experimental subjects has become known as
the Hawthorne effect.” (2, p 225)
“No matter what changes were made—whether there were many or few rest periods, whether the work day was
made longer or shorter, etc—the women produced more and more telephone relays. Although it is hard to pinpoint
the reason for this change, since a number of variables were confounded, it seems quite likely that it was largely due
to the fact that the women knew they were in an experiment, felt the special attention, and wanted to cooperate.
They knew that the experimenters expected the changes in the working conditions to affect them, so they did. They
kept working harder and harder.” (3, p 395)
“To the researchers’ great satisfaction, they discovered that making working conditions better consistently increased
satisfaction and productivity. As the workroom was brightened up through better lighting, for example, productivity
went up. Lighting was further improved, and productivity went up again. To further substantiate their scientific
conclusion, the researchers then dimmed the light: Productivity again improved! It became evident then that the
wiring room workers were responding more to the attention given to them by the researchers than to improved
working conditions.” (4, p 236)
Work and Organizational and Social Psychology textbooks
“Each time an experimental variable was introduced—whether it improved work conditions or made them worse—
the group would express its collective high spirits and involvement in the experimental task by increasing produc-
tion.” (5, p 36)
“Regardless of the conditions, whether there were more or fewer rest periods, longer or shorter work days, each
experimental period produced a higher rate of work than the one before—the women worked harder and more effi-
ciently.” (6, p 414)
 “No matter what level the lighting was set at, productivity increased! There was a steady increase in workers’
output following any change in lighting. In other studies, Mayo systematically varies the length and timing of work
breaks. Longer breaks, shorter breaks, more or fewer breaks, all resulted in a steady increase in worker output.”
(7, p 9)
“The researchers were surprised to find that over the course of the experiment, productivity increased and seemed
to have little to do with the lighting levels. Many explanations of these results have been advanced and debated. The
most frequently discussed is that knowledge of being in an experiment, or what has come to be called the Haw-
thorne effect, caused increases in performance.” (8, p 12)
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